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From James Meade’s ‘Social Dividend’ to 
‘State Bonus’: An Intriguing Chapter in the 
History of a Concept    
Walter Van Trier*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
An important feature of the institutional framework of James Meade’s 
Agathotopia is a ‘social dividend’, i.e. the unconditional and equal cash 
payment made as of right to each and every one. Some years prior to the 
publication in 1989, similar proposals had been widely discussed in Great-
Britain and Continental Europe under the name of ‘basic income’. Yet, in 
Meade’s writings the idea of a social dividend was not new. In fact, 
throughout his life, it regularly resurfaces in many books and articles at 
least since 1935. 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it documents the appearance 
of ‘social dividend’ in the early writings of James Meade. It also discusses 
different discursive communities Meade was involved in and which might 
have been possible origins for the term as well as for the idea of an un-
conditional equal payment to all. Secondly, it shows that in Meade’s writ-
ings a ‘social dividend’ plays different roles, prefiguring in a sense differ-
ent approaches to ‘basic income’ in the present-day literature. The last part 
of the paper tells a little story about a remarkable ‘rendez-vous manqué’ 
between James Meade and the authors of the first recorded modern British 
proposal for a basic income, dating from 1918. 
Keywords: social dividend, basic income, Meade (James), agathotopia, re-
distribution, Cole (G.D.H), state bonus 
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Du dividende social de James Mead au ‘State bonus’ :  
un chapitre intriguant dans l'histoire d'un concept 
Une caractéristique importante du cadre institutionnel de l’Agathotopia 
de James Meade est le « dividende social », c’est-à-dire, le 
versement inconditionnel et égal d'un revenu versé de plein droit à 
chacun et pour tout le monde. Quelques années avant la publication en 
1989, des propositions similaires avaient été largement débattues en 
Grande-Bretagne et en Europe continentale sous le nom de « revenu de 
base ». Pourtant, dans les écrits de Meade, l’idée d’un dividende social 
n’était pas nouvelle. En fait, tout au long de sa vie, il refait régulièrement 
surface dans de nombreux ouvrages et articles au moins depuis 1935. 
L’objectif de cet article est double. Premièrement, il documente 
l’apparition du « dividende social » dans les premiers écrits de James 
Meade. Il aborde également différentes communautés discursives dans 
lesquelles Meade a été impliqué et qui peuvent être des origines possibles 
à la fois du terme et de l’idée d’un paiement égal et inconditionnel à tous. 
Deuxièmement, il montre que, dans les écrits de Meade, un « dividende 
social » joue différents rôles, préfigurant en un sens différentes approches 
du « revenu de base » dans la littérature contemporaine. La dernière partie 
de l’article raconte une anecdote au sujet d’un « rendez-vous manqué » 
remarquable entre James Meade et les auteurs d’une proposition d’un 
revenue de base, qui date de 1918 et qui est la première connue en 
Grande-Bretagne. 
Mots-clés : dividende social, revenu de base, Meade (James), agathotopia, 
redistribution, Cole (G.D.H), state bonus 
JEL: B20, B31, H10, I38 
 
 
I am saddened that so many of my professional col-
leagues seem at present to be so exclusively engaged in 
discussing how best to design fiscal, monetary, foreign-
exchange and wage-setting policies and institutions so 
as to get the best pay-off between inflation and em-
ployment, given the present combination of distribution 
and efficiency objectives in setting rates of pay. This 
work is very important and very valuable. But I appeal 
to some of them to divert some of their attention away 
from making the best of the present bad job and on to 
the design of a better job. They may well not accept 
Agathotopia as the best possible model for this purpose, 
in which case I challenge them to produce a better one. 
But whatever its precise structure, a model of an 
Agathotopian kind is needed during a process of a 
movement towards or a movement away from an ulti-
mate goal and as laying the ideological foundation on 
which a new political consensus might be built. (James 
E. Meade, Liberty, Equality and Efficiency, 1993, 16) 
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1. Prologue 
Addressing in 1988 a conference, organized by the Italian Lega Na-
zionale delle Cooperative e Mutue, James Meade presented the first 
of a series of papers, describing the institutional framework of what 
he considered to be a good-enough place to live in—not a perfect 
place or Utopia, but an Agathotopia.1 An important, even indispensa-
ble feature of this institutional framework, so Meade claims, is “the 
payment by the State to every citizen … of a given income, called a 
Social Dividend. This income is tax-free and is paid unconditionally 
to every citizen whether he or she is employed or unemployed, 
healthy or sick, active or idle, and—at the appropriate rates—young 
or old.” (Meade, 1989, 30). 
Lacking any specific reference as to its intellectual origins, it is not 
unreasonable to think2 that Meade hit on this peculiar device as a re-
sult of the British social policy debate in the decade prior to the Italian 
conference and, hence, that he added it only recently to the set of eco-
nomic policies and institutions he had been considering earlier in his 
career as potentially beneficial “to cope with the inevitable clashes 
between three economic objectives: first, citizens’ freedom of choice in 
markets for jobs and for the satisfaction of their wants (Liberty); se-
cond, avoidance of any resulting intolerable contrast of poverty side 
by side with great riches (Equality); and, third, the use of available 
resources in ways which will produce the technically highest possible 
average standard of living (Efficiency)” (Meade, 1993, 1). 
Indeed, by the late 1980s proposals containing the idea of paying 
to everyone unconditionally and as of right a guaranteed minimum 
income had been widely discussed in Britain under the name ‘basic 
income’. For instance, in 1983, the Voluntary Action Group had taken 
the initiative to bring together a group of academics and policy ana-
lysts to form the Basic Income Research Group (now Citizen’s Income 
Trust). Other signs of the growing interest in the idea were its adop-
tion as part of his political agenda by the then leader of the British 
Liberal-Democrats, Paddy Ashdown (1989) or the positive appraisal 
of basic income schemes by the then assistant editor of the Financial 
Times, Samuel Brittan (1990).3 But, interestingly, in the first half of the 
1980s, most British advocates of basic income were still using the term 
                                                            
1 Meade’s first Agathotopian tale was published in 1989 by the David Hume In-
stitute. A reworked version as well as the subsequent Agathotopian tales have 
been reprinted in Meade (1993). 
2 As is, for instance, suggested by Ralph W. Pfouts (1993) in his review of 
Meade’s collection of Agathotopian tales. 
3 The discussion about basic income was not confined to Britain. In 1986, at the 
initiative of the Belgian philosopher Philippe Van Parijs, a two-day conference 
was organised assembling most of the people working on the idea at that time. 
This conference led to the founding of the Basic Income European (now Earth) 
Network, linking the different people and groups interested in debating the idea. 
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‘social dividend’. For instance, a 1983 paper by Anne Miller, another 
BIRG-member, was titled ‘In Praise of Social Dividends’. Guy Stand-
ing, at that time still working for the ILO World Employment Pro-
gramme, used the term ‘social dividend’ for a scheme “by which eve-
ry individual, regardless of work status, would receive a guaranteed 
basic income” in the final chapter of his 1986 monograph on unem-
ployment and labour market flexibility in the United Kingdom 
(Standing, 1986, 138-140). In his 1985 book, The State, Bill Jordan used 
this term throughout the book, thanking his fellow-members of the 
Basic Income Research Group for allowing him to deepen his under-
standing of “the implications of the social dividend proposal …” 
(1985, vii). In fact, what developed into the Basic Income Research 
Group was originally set-up by the NCVO, in 1983, as the Social Div-
idend Group. Hence, the conjecture that it was this debate that in-
spired Meade and stimulated him to adopt a social dividend as an 
important feature of the Agathotopian institutional set-up is quite 
understandable. 
Yet, this conjecture is wrong. Meade’s use of the term ‘social divi-
dend’ to refer to the idea of paying an equal sum unconditionally to 
everyone—or, if one wants to use the modern terminology, a ‘basic 
income’—predates with nearly half a century the writing of the 
Agathotopian tales. Indeed, it can already be found in Meade’s writ-
ings from the mid 1930’s. As a matter of fact, as will be documented 
below, ‘social dividend’ resurfaces with such a perplexing regularity 
in Meade’s writings throughout his career that it is difficult not to 
conclude that, from very early on, it constitutes a core feature of his 
view on how the world could be made a better place to live in. 
Straightening out the historical record is a first objective of this 
paper. Sections 2 and 3 focus on how ‘social dividend’ appears in 
Meade’s early writing. Sections 5 and 6 explore different so-called 
discursive communities in which Meade could possibly have encoun-
tered the idea. But apart from the historical record, there are at least 
two more good reasons for looking in a more detailed way at the 
place and the role of ‘social dividend’ in Meade’s work. 
First, reading Meade helps to gain additional insight in the com-
plexities of the debate today. Indeed, although it has been presented 
recurrently as “a beautifully, disarmingly simple idea”, basic income 
is still vindicated “using the widest range of arguments” (Van Parijs, 
1992, 3). Even if, basically, the implied format, i.e. an equal and un-
conditional cash amount to be paid to all individually, does not 
change, the reasons to implement the device as well as the task(s) it is 
expected to perform may vary substantially, resulting in an amazing-
ly diverse set of implementation schemes. As will be illustrated in 
Section 4, something similar is the case in the writings of James 
Meade. A detailed reading reveals that ‘social dividend’ does not al-
ways play the same role. In this sense, reading Meade can be helpful 
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in teasing out the different meanings of basic income in the present-
day debate. 
Secondly, many contributors to the recent debate see basic income 
schemes as signalling a new paradigm in social and economic poli-
cy—a new paradigm at odds with what some have called the Full 
Employment Welfare State with its institutional framework roots in 
the teachings of Keynes and Beveridge. The similarity between basic 
income and a negative income tax as well as the fact that several basic 
income advocates do not (seem to) bother too much about the tradi-
tional goal of full-employment seem to be a case in point. In this con-
text, Meade’s writings may confront present-day basic income advo-
cates with the (for them) somewhat puzzling case of a Keynesian, an 
important architect of the British Welfare State, and a lifelong adher-
ent to full employment, who, nevertheless, advocated throughout his 
life the introduction of a social dividend as a necessary feature of a 
decent society. 
2. When Did James Meade Adopt ‘Social Dividend’? 
An incomplete list of places where James Meade mentions or discuss-
es, approvingly, ‘social dividend’ includes, amongst others, the re-
markable booklet Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property 
(1965), his books The Intelligent Radical’s Guide to Economic Policy 
(1975) and The Just Economy (1976), a well-known article on poverty in 
the Oxford Economic Papers (1978), the report of the Meade-committee 
on the reform of Direct Taxation (1978), his Copenhagen-lecture 
(1983) marking the centenary of Keynes’s birth, his 1983 T.H. Mar-
shall Lecture on technological development and unemployment, as 
well as more recently, of course, his Agathotopian tales, collected in 
Liberty, Equality, Efficiency (1993) and, finally, Full Employment Re-
gained? (1995). 
As mentioned above, Meade’s first use of the term ‘social divi-
dend’ predates the oldest item on this list with some 30 years. Yet, 
until the end of the 1980s most participants in the basic income debate 
situated Meade’s first encounter with the idea of an unconditional 
and universal income guarantee somewhere around the 1970s. Take, 
for instance, two active members of the London-based Basic Income 
Research Group or BIRG, Anne Miller (1983) and Tony Walter (1989). 
Both do refer to James Meade as an important figure in the history of 
basic income, but the writings they refer to were all published in the 
1970s or later. 
The few scholars situating Meade’s adoption of ‘social dividend’ at 
an earlier date considered it as the result of encountering a reform 
proposal put forward in 1943 by the liberal politician, Lady Juliet 
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Rhys-Williams4, as an alternative to the well-known Beveridge report, 
Social Security and its Allied Services. Hermione Parker, another key 
figure in BIRG as editor of its Bulletin but also the research assistant 
of Lady Rhys-Williams’ son, Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams, writes in 
Instead of the Dole: “Lady Rhys-WilliamsRhys-Williams’s proposals ... 
In Britain they were worked on by Nobel prize-winner James Meade 
in books and papers published during the ensuing thirty-five years” 
(Parker, 1989, 122-123). Or consider how Tony Atkinson describes his 
own encounter with basic income: “I was first prompted to look at 
basic income schemes by James Meade … Not only did he regale me 
with stories about the early proponents of the idea, such as Lady 
Rhys-Williams (author of Something to Look Forward To, 1943), but he 
persuaded me to give a seminar in Cambridge on the topic in 1968, 
which led to my first book.” (Atkinson, 1995, x). 
The reason for accepting without further ado that the Rhys-
Williams proposal was at the origin of Meade’s interest in and adop-
tion of social dividend schemes is obvious. Meade’s Planning and the 
Price Mechanism (1948) contains a four pages long subsection entitled: 
“Lady Rhys-Williams’ Rationalisation of Income Redistribution”.5 To 
refer to the Rhys-Williams proposal Meade uses the term ‘social divi-
dend’. 
Planning and the Price Mechanism (hereafter: PPM) is subtitled The 
Liberal-Socialist Solution. It was Meade’s contribution to the debate 
about how and when Britain would return to normal economic condi-
tions after World War II and whether this would involve planning or 
not. The thesis of the book is, Meade wrote in the introduction, 
that a large measure of state foresight and intervention is required to 
guide the economy from war to peace, to prevent inflationary and defla-
tionary pressures, to ensure a tolerably equitable distribution of income 
and property, and to prevent or control the anti-social rigging of the mar-
ket by private interests, but that these objectives can be achieved in an ef-
ficient and a free society only if an extensive use is made of the mecha-
nisms of competition, free enterprise and the free market determination of 
prices and output. (PPM, 1948, v-vi) 
After dealing with “The Control of Inflation and Deflation” (Chapter 
II), Meade treats “The Distribution of Income and Property” (Chapter 
III). The chapter contains subsections on incentives and the progres-
sive taxation of earnings, food subsidies and the national minimum, 
equality of opportunity, education and the movement to better-paid 
jobs, inheritance and the capital levy. Between the section on “food 
                                                            
4 For a detailed analysis of Lady Rhys-Williams original campaign, see Sloman 
(2016b) and Orsi (2017). 
5 An article by Meade (1949), published in The Political Quarterly, but originally 
written as a memorandum for the Labour's Party Research Department in No-
vember 1948, contains an essentially similar suggestion without mentioning the 
Rhys-Williams Scheme, although referring to Planning and the Price Mechanism. 
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subsidies and the national minimum” and the one on “equality of 
opportunity”, one finds a section bearing the title “Lady Rhys-
Williams’ Rationalization of Income Distribution”. Meade qualifies 
the proposal as an “exceedingly stimulating proposal for an architec-
tonic reform” and summarizes it as follows: 
It is suggested that a straightforward monetary payment or allowance or 
“social dividend” should be paid to every man, woman and child in the 
country—although the rate of payment might, of course, be lower for 
children than for adults. This would take the place of all social security 
benefits, such as unemployment benefit, old-age pensions, health benefits, 
children’s allowances. Every man, woman and child would thus have his 
or her basic minimum whether in sickness or in health, in work or out of 
work, young or old. There need be no means test and no tests whether a 
man was seeking work or whether a man was genuinely ill. Doctors could 
stop writing out health certificates and get on with their job of curing their 
patients. Employment Exchanges would stop fussing about unemploy-
ment insurance and get on with their job of introducing employers with 
vacancies to workers without jobs. The Ministry of National Insurance 
could be closed down. 
These universal personal allowances would also take the place of the 
whole apparatus of allowances under the income tax. All income (other 
than the ‘personal allowances’ which would be tax-free) would be taxed at 
a standard rate of tax. The whole apparatus of Pay-as-You-Earn would 
disappear; and the only task of the inland Revenue in this field would be 
to ensure that all income was taxed at the standard rate of tax. All person-
al assessments would cease for income tax purposes, though not, of 
course, for sur-tax. (PPM, 1948, 43) 
Following this summary, Meade (PPM, 44) mentions four major ad-
vantages of the proposal: 1) it would mean administrative simplifica-
tion and less bureaucracy, 2) there would be a gain in personal free-
dom, 3) it could be used to lead to a great increase in equality of in-
comes, 4) the system would afford a perfect instrument for the most 
effective and prompt control over total national expenditures in the 
interest of avoiding inflation and deflation. However, he goes on, alt-
hough its lack of a means-test (and, therefore, its escape from any 
poverty or unemployment trap) makes it compare favourably to pre-
war arrangements, the lack of a work-test might represent a serious 
danger due to the adverse effects on incentives. As a result, the sub-
section on the Rhys-Williams proposal ends without a clear judg-
ment. Is some revolution on the lines of this scheme desirable? Can 
we afford to face the sort of tax-rates on additional earnings which at 
present only begin to rule in the middle ranges of incomes below the 
sur-tax level? Could the scheme with modifications be made worka-
ble? Meade concludes: “Certainly it deserves the most careful and 
serious examination; and some rationalisation of our present largely 
haphazard methods of income redistribution ought surely to be pos-
sible.” (PPM, 1948, 46) 
Two points are worth emphasizing. 
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The first point concerns how the Rhys-Williams proposal is 
framed. Meade’s summary of it is, in a sense, doubly misleading. 
First, because Meade refers explicitly to the scheme using the name 
‘social dividend’, something Lady Rhys-Williams never does. Second-
ly, because there is no clue as to Meade’s own use and advocacy of 
‘social dividend’ prior to the publication of the Rhys-Williams’s 
scheme. So, readers of Planning and the Price Mechanism not acquaint-
ed with some of Meade’s earlier work could easily be lead to the con-
clusion that not only the practical scheme, but also the name and the 
idea were inserted into Meade’s conceptual framework after his hav-
ing read or met Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams. (See, a.o., Berry, 1954 ; 
Kahn, 1984) Moreover, the fact that Meade literally presented Lady 
Rhys-Williams as “the first proponent of the scheme” (PPM, 1948, 44) 
probably lead many people to be in ignorance of his own prior con-
tribution, myself included Tony Atkinson (1996, 91) would write in 
an obituary article reviewing Meade’s contributions to economics. 
Note also that the phrase ‘social dividend’ is put between quotes, 
strengthening thereby the suggestion that Meade quotes Lady Rhys-
Williams. 
The second point concerns timing. Lady Rhys-Williams’ elaborat-
ed plea for “a new Social Contract” is to be found in Something to Look 
Forward to, a book published in 1943. Two articles in The Economist 
suffice to witness that the scheme succeeded in gaining a certain pub-
lic attention. On 25 December 1943, the Rhys-Williams proposal was 
referred to as a possible way of bridging the gap between the reform 
of social security and the reform of taxation, i.e. as a feasible basis for 
a “Beveridge-as-you-go-system”. Three years later, on 12 January 
1946, The Economist referred again to the proposal in an article on 
“PAYE simplified”. Yet, after giving an extensive summary and posi-
tive appraisal of the scheme in the June 1946 issue of the Economic 
Journal, H.S. Booker of the London School of Economics noted with 
regret that the scheme seemed to have been forgotten.6 
Detailing when exactly Meade learned about the Rhys-Williams 
scheme is difficult. According to Peter Sloman (private communica-
tion by email, 23 September 2016) the earliest contact his archival 
search allowed him to establish is a letter, dated 17 March 1948, in 
which Lady Rhys-Williams drew Meade’s attention to an article in the 
Lloyds Bank Review (Chalmers, 1948) mentioning her ideas. In a letter 
to the present author, dated 26 April 19897, James Meade writes re-
                                                            
6 Interestingly, the relevant part of Rhys-Williams 1943 book was included by 
E.T. Weiler in a collection of writings on economic policy including also a chapter 
by Milton Friedman (Rhys-Williams, 1956). Her 1953 book, Taxation and Incentive, 
was favourably reviewed in professional American journals. In the early 1970s, 
the proposal provided the inspiration for Arthur Cockfield’s Tax Credit Scheme 
(Sloman, 2016a). 
7 The letter can be consulted in the Meade archives at the LSE: Meade/4/40. 
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membering being introduced to Lady Rhys-Williams (most probably 
by Lord Robbins) when he was working as Director of the Economic 
Section in the Cabinet Office, a post he occupied in 1946 and 1947. 
Yet, being heavily involved in the discussion of the Beveridge report 
at the time of its publication, it is not unlikely that Meade had already 
read the 1946 Booker or/and The Economist article or even the earlier 
1943 The Economist article. Indeed, in the preface to Stepping Stones to 
Independence, a book by Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams (1989, xi), Meade 
mentions having had “the great privilege of knowing and working on 
these subjects with his mother, Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams (as she was 
then called), at the time when the famous Beveridge Report was being 
published and discussed”. However, even if Meade’s encounter with 
the Rhys-Williams scheme8 would have taken place shortly after the 
Beveridge report was made public in late 1942 this would not move 
the event back in time enough to precede Meade’s first mention of 
paying an equal sum to all unconditionally and using the phrase ‘so-
cial dividend’ to refer to it. 
In fact, Meade’s first known use of the term ‘social dividend’ is to 
be found in a paper written in 1935, outlining an economic policy for 
a future Labour Government. The paper was written for the Policy 
Subcommittee of the National Executive Committee of the Labour 
Party and submitted for publication as a New Fabian Research Bu-
reau pamphlet. Since G.D.H. Cole and E.F.M. Durbin recommended 
against publication9, it stayed unpublished until 1988, when it ap-
peared in the first volume of Meade’s Collected Papers (Howson, 
1988, 33-78). 
What, apart from his characteristic modesty10, made Meade adopt 
without any references to his own earlier work the Lady Rhys-
Williams proposal? The conjecture I would suggest is that what is at 
stake here is not the idea of paying an equal amount unconditionally 
to every member of the community. In the abstract, this idea is a 
deeply rooted feature of Meade’s view of the world.11 What the Rhys-
                                                            
8 An earlier and in some respect rather different version of Something to Look For-
ward To had been privately printed and circulated in early 1942. Note also that in 
her later book, Taxation and Incentive, Lady Rhys-Williams (1953, 120) remarks 
that the 1942 proposal was “drawn up many months before the publication of the 
Beveridge Committee’s Report, and in complete ignorance of the schemes to be 
included …”  
9 For possible reasons for this rejection, see: Durbin (1985, 194-198). 
10 In his recent monograph on James Meade’s contributions to economics, David 
Reisman (2018, 57) quotes a letter in which Meade credits, even still in 1973, Juliet 
Rhys-Williams with being the originator of the scheme: “No, no, Lady Rhys Wil-
liams, not JEM.” (letter from James Meade to Sidney Golt, dated 24 July 1973) 
11 Cfr. “For Meade a more equitable distribution of income and wealth really was 
fundamental to a civilized and ordered society and the lengths to which he was 
prepared to go to secure such an outcome can be most clearly seen in his com-
ments on social policy.” (Greenaway, 1990, 295) 
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Williams scheme provided him with—probably for the first time?—
was a practical device allowing for the implementation of the idea. If 
this conjecture holds, one would expect to find the idea of a social 
dividend clearly expressed in earlier work without, however, any dis-
tinct trait of a practical scheme to implement it. Let us, therefore, ex-
amine how ‘social dividend’ appears in Meade’s writings prior to his 
encounter with Lady Rhys-Williams or her proposal.  
3. Meade and his ‘Social Dividend’ in the 1930s 
In his 1935 paper, Outline of Economic Policy for a Labour Government, 
Meade introduces the term ‘social dividend’ in the final paragraph of 
the section on budgetary policy, stating that it will be “the object of 
the Labour Government to use its budgetary policy to aid it in attain-
ing its objectives of full employment, of socialising different indus-
tries and of providing for greater equality.” (Meade, [1935] 1988, 50) 
However, Meade explains, Government will only be in a position to 
tackle the latter problem after everything is put into place to prevent 
serious unemployment. Once this latter task accomplished, govern-
ment could, for instance, more easily raise the income tax to finance 
the development of social services, like making health insurance non-
contributory or lowering the age for old age pensions. 
Apparently, Meade did not seem to put a lot of trust in the effect 
these measures would have on resulting in greater equality. The 
fragment explaining why is worth quoting at length. 
the only certain way in which a much greater degree of equality can be 
achieved is by the state obtaining ownership of the national debt and the 
debt which it has issued in compensation for the socialisation of private 
undertakings or by obtaining ownership of further forms of property such 
as the land. For by so doing the state will be able to receive interest, profit 
or rent from this capital and property without paying interest on compen-
sation debt to the previous owners. It is at this point that certain specific 
taxes on all forms of privately owned capital such as the Rignano Duties 
or the levy on capital … should be imposed. … The increased surplus of 
the Revenue Budget can then be allocated partly for the purpose of devel-
oping those services which provide for greater equality and partly as a 
further income for the Capital Budget. By these means the position will 
gradually be reached in which the state has a very large income from state 
property in the Revenue Budget and no expenditure on interest in the 
Revenue Budget, and at this point it will be possible to allocate part of this 
income as a social dividend to be distributed from the Revenue Budget on 
any desired principle of equality, and part as a surplus to be paid as an in-
come to the Capital Budget for further capital development. As this stage 
is reached the government will, by paying a smaller or larger part of this 
sum as a social dividend to the members of the community, be able to con-
trol the amount of the national income spent on consumption and the 
amount allocated to capital development. When even at very low interest 
rates very little development is profitable, a large proportion can be paid 
out as a social dividend; whereas if new and profitable fields of develop-
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ment appear a much larger part can be apportioned to the Capital Budget 
for this capital development. (Meade, [1935] 1988, 52-53) 
Although according to his own words Meade refers in this paper “to 
a social dividend very much on distributive grounds” (letter to the 
author, 26 April 1989), clearly, the device plays also a role similar to 
the one he would in 1948 attribute to the Rhys-Williams Scheme, i.e. 
as an instrument for the most effective and prompt control over na-
tional expenditures. In Planning and the Price Mechanism this device 
was cast as “useful in avoiding inflation and deflation”; in Outline for 
an Economic Policy as enabling “to control the amount of national in-
come spent on consumption and the amount allocated to capital de-
velopment”. Note that this casting implies in both cases that the 
amount of cash paid as a ‘social dividend’ can fluctuate over time. 
Note also the phrase “on any desired principle of equality” in the 
1935 paper, which does not necessarily commit the ‘social dividend’ 
to be paid equally and unconditionally to all as was the case in the 
Rhys-Williams Scheme. 
In An Introduction to Economic Analysis and Policy (hereafter: EAP), 
a book published in 1936, i.e. approximately six years before Rhys-
Williams’s Something to Look Forward To, both the equality and the 
universality conditions are stated clearly. The term ‘social dividend’ 
appears four times in the book; three times in the main text, one time 
in the index. As in Planning and the Price Mechanism the phrase is put 
between inverted commas; even the index mentions: ‘social divi-
dend’, inverted commas included. I will come back to this point later, 
but let us first look a bit more in depth at the role ‘social dividend’ 
plays in Meade’s 1936 book. 
The term ‘social dividend’ appears in three different chapters: the 
chapter on “Public Management and Planning of Industry” (part II, 
chapter VIII), the chapter on “Equality by Taxation” (part III, chapter 
IV) and the chapter on “Redistribution or Socialisation of Property” 
(part III, chapter V). In the latter two cases, Meade lists several ways 
of distributing (parts of) state revenue (either from taxes or from pub-
lic property): through the provision of “educational, medical or other 
services’ or directly by payments of ‘old age pensions, unemployment 
relief, widows’ and orphans’ pensions ...”. To these he adds, in the 
chapter on equality by taxation, “or even of an equal ‘social dividend’ 
to all persons” (EAP, 1936, 231), and, in the chapter on redistribution 
or socialization of property, “or could be distributed as an equal ‘so-
cial dividend’ to all members of the community” (EAP, 1936, 251). 
The main thing to notice here is the explicit mention of both the 
equality and the universality condition typical for the class of social 
dividend or basic income proposals which were missing in the 1935 
paper. 
However, in the earlier chapter on “Public Management and Plan-
ning of Industry” (part II, chapter VIII) ‘social dividend’ appears in a 
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rather different guise. This chapter follows the one on the “Control of 
Monopoly”. In it, Meade establishes that most of the methods availa-
ble for controlling industry, i.e. anti-combination laws, educational 
measures, rationalisation, taxes and subsidies or price control, are ei-
ther incomplete or impracticable. The next chapter scrutinizes one 
more method of control, i.e. the direct management of monopolistic 
industries by public bodies. Meade carefully notes that control does 
not necessarily imply the control of total industry. Only the monopo-
listic sectors are targeted. Neither does it equal public property of the 
industries concerned, even and although it implies public manage-
ment. After discussing in detail the conditions guaranteeing efficien-
cy, he treats problems of pricing and management, noting that “even 
if all industries were publicly controlled and all capital and land were 
socially owned, use could be made of a pricing system similar to the 
pricing system of a competitive economy.” (EAP, 1936, 197 ; Meade 
underlines) Next, Meade explains how one should proceed for this 
pricing system to work. 
The state would receive any profit made on the capital and land invested 
in each socialised concern; it could pay part of this income as a ‘social div-
idend’ to consumers and could save part to finance the capital develop-
ment justified in each socialised concern at the current rate of interest. If 
there were unemployment, the state bank could fix lower rates of interest 
in order to justify greater expenditure on capital development by each so-
cialised concern—financed if necessary in the first place by the creation of 
new money. Alternatively, the state could distribute a larger ‘social divi-
dend’ to consumers in order to stimulate expenditure on consumption 
goods—again financed, if necessary, by the creation of new money, until 
the increased expenditure by consumers had increased the state’s receipts 
of industrial profits sufficiently to finance the greater ‘social dividend’. 
(EAP, 1936, 197) 
It is clear that when the term was used for the first time in the book, 
‘social dividend’ played a quite different role than in the other two 
cases. Nothing as simple here as in the case of introducing equal 
grants to everyone in order to equalise the distribution of incomes, 
but a very complex and complicated picture of fine-tuning, primarily 
concerned with tackling problems of demand management and stim-
ulating investment. In fact, as in his 1935 paper or later in his 1948 
book, ‘social dividend’ is framed here as an anti-cyclical policy device 
or steering mechanism. 
Two major remarks seem needed here. First, given that in the re-
cent past basic income proposals have been presented at several occa-
sions as devices allowing to manage the supply of labour and that 
basic income experiments are mainly set-up trying to establish its ef-
fect on the incentive to search for and accept jobs, it is worth noting 
that Meade does not present ‘social dividend’ from this angle. Signifi-
cantly, the chapter on the optimal supply of labour does not even 
show the slightest trace of possible effects of a ‘social dividend’. Sec-
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ondly, in none of the fragments quoted does Meade describe a con-
crete mechanism neither does he give even a small hint of how it 
could be administrated or implemented. Neither is ‘social dividend’ 
presented as giving way to a reconstruction of the tax-benefit system. 
Yet, Meade’s 1936 book did contain an attempt to work out some-
thing which could be construed as providing a first step to a practical 
social dividend scheme. Remarkably, however, the attempt concerns 
not the equal tax-transfer-like social dividend of the later chapters, 
but the complex one, pictured as a fine-tuning device in the earlier 
chapter. 
As mentioned above, Meade introduces ‘social dividend’ for the 
first time as a tool to stimulate either capital investment or expendi-
ture on consumption goods, if necessary by new money. Implicitly, 
this refers to a proposal, worked out in the sixth chapter of the first 
part of the book, “Direct Control of Expenditure on Consumption” 
(EAP, 1936, 49-60). After discussing two other methods to stimulate 
economic activity, i.e. banking policy and public works, Meade con-
siders the use of an unconventional method which he calls “consumer 
credits”. 
Traditional methods of intervention may not be sufficient for sev-
eral reasons, Meade says, an important one being that almost inevita-
bly time-lags will be involved. The decision to speed up (or slow 
down) the economy only takes effect after some time. It does not im-
mediately result in more (or less) expenditure. If this is the case, he 
goes on, it might be interesting to consider in detail a less orthodox 
method of controlling the total volume of expenditure, based on the 
fact that “there is one form of expenditure which should be capable of 
almost instantaneous expansion, and that is the purchase of con-
sumption goods by individuals.” (EAP, 1936, 50) In Meade’s view, 
there are two ways to proceed. One can rely on existing Unemploy-
ment Benefits and link the level of benefits (and contributions) to the 
level of unemployment (above what Meade named the ‘standard 
rate’). Yet, this scheme does not level out possible fluctuations in in-
come and expenditure for property owners. One can also try to reme-
dy this by adding some form of tax-rate flexibility to the first scheme. 
This last feature, Meade names consumer credits. 
This argument will be elaborated and slightly modified in Consum-
ers’ Credits and Unemployment—a book published by Meade in 1938 
and described by David Vines as “perhaps the earliest official pub-
lished advocacy of fine-tuned Keynesian policies” and foreshadowing 
both the Full Employment White Paper of 1944 and the Stagflation 
Project Meade worked on in the 1980’s (Vines, 2007, 8). 
Keynes reviewed the book in the Economic Journal (March 1938), 
noting that “Mr. Meade has performed a useful service in bringing 
into the picture consumers’ credits—or rather consumers’ subsidies, 
for this, and not aids to instalment purchasing, is what he has in 
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view—not as a magical specific, but as one of the possible means of 
levelling out fluctuations in effective demand.” (Keynes, 1938, 67). 
The proposal is summarised: “Mr. Meade’s own proposal is ‘to make 
a monthly payment, which varies with the volume of ‘depression’ 
unemployment, to every member of the community whose income is 
below a certain level’”. In practice, Keynes says this would mean “to 
(i) Old Age Pensioners, (ii) all workers insured under the existing 
Widows’, Orphans’, and Old Age Contributory Pensions Scheme, and 
(iii) the wives and children of such workers.” And he goes on: “Mr. 
Meade hopes to get his money back by a progressive tax on employ-
ment when times are good. He is not decisive as to whether the em-
ployers (who do not receive any part of the subsidy) should pay any 
part of the tax, but suggests that they should do so.” (Keynes, 1938, 
68). There seems to be a good idea behind this proposal, Keynes 
notes. 
But if the idea is to be brought within the field of practical politics it 
would be wise, I suggest, to make it part and parcel of the various con-
tributory insurance schemes, even at the expense of somewhat limiting its 
scope ... the policy is obviously an extension and working out of the idea 
of budgeting for a deficit in depressions and a surplus in recoveries. It is, 
in fact, a scheme providing that particular sources of savings should ac-
crue only when there is evidence of an outlet for them in investment. All 
this might be useful in spite of the important criticism that it is directed 
towards ironing out fluctuations without necessarily raising the average 
level of activity to the optimum level. (Keynes, 1938, 69) 
Three more criticisms of the argument are voiced: 1) if Meade wants 
to finance the subsidies by an increase in cash, there is no reason why 
the advisable increase in cash is equal to the advisable subsidy to con-
sumers, 2) to arrive at the critical levels of unemployment Meade 
makes a rather problematic distinction between intermittent and 
structural unemployment, 3) no attempt is made to compare the ef-
fects of a given amount of funds applied to consumers’ subsidies with 
those of an equal sum applied to increased investment. Keynes con-
cludes that “Mr. Meade must mainly rely ... on the argument that 
consumers’ subsidies can be introduced without preparation and on 
an easily adjustable scale, on occasions when, for one reason or an-
other, an adequate increase in investment is impracticable.” (Keynes, 
1938, 71) As we know, that was more or less the point made by 
Meade when proposing the nucleus of the idea in his 1936 book. 
So far for the first qualification. If, prior to the 1940s, Meade 
searched for a practical scheme, he certainly did not look for it in the 
direction of an instrument to redistribute income by reforming thor-
oughly the tax-benefit system. What he actually looked for was a fine-
tuning device. But in that case he considered something implying tar-
geting or a means-test. 
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There is, however, a second qualification to make. As mentioned 
before, the third appearance of social dividends in Economic Analysis 
and Policy was in a chapter on the redistribution or socialisation of 
property. More specifically, Meade diagnoses the problem of inequal-
ity of income to be first and foremost rooted in the unequal owner-
ship of property. To overcome this problem, one might, therefore, 
want to reach a more equal ownership by all members of the commu-
nity. “The ideal at which this solution would aim is the attractive ‘dis-
tributist’ state in which all men are free, equal and independent, be-
cause all men own a modicum of property without any glaring ine-
qualities in such ownership.” (EAP, 1936, 249) 
To reach this so-called ‘distributist solution’ one could, according 
to Meade, use similar methods as those mentioned already in the 1935 
paper, i.e. impose steeply progressive death duties or alter the inher-
itance laws so as to prevent the passing on of property above a certain 
amount. The resulting state income, Meade says, could be used to re-
distribute property or to make the income distribution more equal by 
providing free social services or cash benefits, such as equal social 
dividends to each individual. 
4. Intermezzo 
From the detailed analysis of Meade’s early writings in the former 
sections, it is clear that, even if the format of the device—paying an 
equal amount of cash unconditionally to all individuals—is identical 
in each case, ‘social dividend’ is cast in different roles, depending on 
the specific context in which it appears and the task it is expected to 
perform. In later writings by Meade, each of these different roles will 
re-appear. 
In its first role ‘social dividend’ takes on the character of a Redis-
tributive Instrument. It refers, clearly, to the most simple and archetyp-
ical use of the idea. In this role, the goal is unavoidably the eradica-
tion of poverty or equalising the income distribution. The technique 
favoured is paying equal social dividends and other transfers, or in-
tegrating the tax-benefit system. Besides the many fragments I have 
quoted the best example in Meade’s writings is, most probably, to be 
found in ‘Poverty in the Welfare State’, an article published in 1978 in 
the Oxford Economic Papers. In its second role it takes on the character of 
a Steering Mechanism. Again, the technique favoured is paying equal 
social dividends (whether through an integrated system or not). But 
the goal is broader: walking the narrow path between inflation and 
deflation, targeting full employment without inflation—in one word, 
fine-tuning.  
It is clear that both characters will not necessarily be able to fulfil 
their respective roles at the same time. Indeed, not only does social 
dividend as a steering mechanism unavoidably require a level that 
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fluctuates, which would be quite contrary to what one excepts from a 
policy providing income security to poor people. Worse, it is not at all 
clear why the level of the social dividend needed to stabilize the 
economy would be exactly the same as, or very similar to, the level 
needed to eradicate poverty. Moreover, as has frequently been argued 
until today, other policy measures might be used to accomplish these 
two tasks separately and, maybe, more efficiently than is the case by 
using only one instrument. 
However, ‘social dividend’ performs still a third role in Meade’s 
early writings. In that role it takes on the character of, what I would 
call, a Societal Framework. What does this mean? 
One of the contexts in which ‘social dividend’ appeared in Econom-
ic Analysis and Policy was that of a widening inequality of property. In 
this context, Meade’s argument for ‘social dividend’ presented it, in 
fact, as a possible substitute for a ‘distributist state’12 or, what he later 
would call, a ‘property-owning democracy’. Implementing a ‘social 
dividend’ would in that case mean, taking a step to a new societal 
model or institutional framework. Meade would revisit this topic 
regularly in his later work. The booklet in which he does so most ex-
plicitly is Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property (1965) (here-
after: EEOP), where the argument—given the present-day discussion 
about the effect of automation—even takes a prophetic turn when 
Meade stresses that in a context of automation the problem of the un-
equal distribution of property may get dramatic proportions. 
Automation, Meade writes in 1965, will increase the output per 
head, but might as well reduce the amount of labour needed in the 
automated industries. Absorbing new and redundant workers “might 
require an absolute reduction in the real wage rate on efficiency 
grounds”. Even if this could be avoided, “automation might well 
cause output per head to rise relatively to the marginal product of 
labour”. We should, then, rephrase the problem of unemployment, 
Meade urges. 
What, we ask, shall we all do with our leisure when we need to work only 
an hour or two a day to obtain the total output of real goods and services 
needed to satisfy our wants? But the problem is really much more difficult 
than that. The question which we should ask is: what shall we all do when 
output per man-hour of work is extremely high but practically the whole 
of output goes to a few property owners, while the mass of the workers 
are relatively (or even absolutely) worse off than before? (EEOP, 1965, 25-
26) 
To avoid this ‘Brave New Capitalists’ Paradise’ as Meade calls it, he 
discusses four alternatives, two of which—a ‘Trade Union State’ or 
“setting a real minimum wage level” and a ‘Welfare State’ or “taxa-
                                                            
12 The notion of a ‘distributist state’ refers at least implicitly to the works of Ches-
terton and Belloc and their critique of  the ‘Servile State’ and of industrial capital-
ism as causing the destruction of property ownership. 
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tion of incomes of the rich to subsidise the poor”—are readily dis-
carded. Meade’s attention goes primarily to a ‘Property-Owning De-
mocracy’ (EEOP, 1965, 40-66), clearly a repainted version of the old 
distributist state and characterized by a more or less equal division of 
property. Lastly, Meade considers the alternative of a ‘Socialist State’ 
combining an efficient level of the real wage rate with an equitable 
distribution of income by turning to the social ownership of property. 
Such a state has the advantage that, even if the efficient wage level is 
a low one and a larger part of national income goes to profits, these 
profits would accrue to the state and could be distributed equally to 
every citizen as a social dividend. Meade notes that this solution has 
one basic point in common with the distributist solution. “In both 
cases income from property is equally divided between all citizens.” 
(EEOP, 1965, 66) 
5. Where Did ‘Social Dividend’ Come From? 
Earlier I noted that in Introduction to Economic Analysis and Policy as 
well as in Planning and the Price Mechanism, most intriguingly, ‘social 
dividend’ is always put between inverted commas, even in the index. 
What does this mean? Does this indicate that Meade borrowed a term 
used by someone else or in another context? If so, no source or refer-
ence is provided. Or did the inverted commas signal, on the contrary, 
that the term is new and coined by Meade himself? And in the latter 
case, does this also mean that Meade invents the device? So what?13 
Section 2 made clear why Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams has no place 
on the list of possible sources for Meade’s ‘social dividend’. Neither 
as a source for the term nor as a source for the idea of paying an equal 
amount unconditionally to every individual. Yet, several other candi-
dates are available. 
But before discussing briefly where Meade may have picked up 
the name, if not the idea, let me first say something about the term 
‘social dividend’ itself. Meade’s terminology was certainly not yet 
standardized in Outline of an Economic Policy for a Labour Government. 
He used ‘social dividend’ as well as ‘national dividend’ referring to a 
system of cash payment to individuals. This, however, was not the 
most common meaning of the term. Indeed, at that time, national div-
idend was mostly used to refer to what we now call the national 
product. Even if lapses did occur. For instance, in his well-known ar-
ticle on wage subsidies, Kaldor (1936) used both social dividend and 
                                                            
13 A reviewer remarked that the term ‘social dividend’ did not occur between 
inverted comma’s in Meade’s 1935 paper. This might lead to a third interpretion. 
Given that in his recollection the paper was not accepted for publication as a 
NFRB-paper by Cole and Durbin, amongst others, because of the reference to a 
social dividend, Meade may have used inverted comma’s in later writing to indi-
cate the controversial status of the idea. 
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national dividend in the latter sense.14 In the case of Meade, however, 
no doubt is possible. After 1935, he will use the phrase ‘social divi-
dend’ consistently to refer to a quite specific concept, i.e. the idea of 
paying everyone equally unconditionally an amount of cash.  
In this section I will turn to the question of the potential intellectu-
al roots of Meade’s ‘social dividend’, considering different so-called 
communities of discourse in which Meade was involved and which 
could have provided a fertile soil for ‘social dividend’. 
The first community of discourse that comes to mind is, of course, the 
Cambridge Circus and the small group of people witnessing from close 
by the making of Keynes’s General Theory. Meade was part of the Cir-
cus. His Economic Analysis and Policy (1936) can be considered to be 
the first Keynesian textbook on economic policy and one of the first 
spin-offs of Keynes’s General Theory. Putting ‘social dividend’ be-
tween inverted commas may mean, therefore, that he is trying to im-
port something new into the Keynesian discourse and, hence, uses 
deliberately a novel term. A potential candidate for this new feature, 
one might conjecture, was the idea of using consumer credits (or so-
cial dividends) as a tool generating effects on aggregate demand more 
speedily than public works or banking policy. But, as noted above, 
when writing more extensively about consumer’s credits, Meade ap-
pears to be considering a targeted and not really universal payment. 
Although no real indication can be found that the concept origi-
nated in or was even congenial to Keynesian thinking, it is worth not-
ing that at least one other member of the Circus referred to a ‘social 
dividend’ in writing, namely Joan Robinson (1937). Contrary to 
Meade, she even mentions a very concrete proposal—“1£ to every 
citizen with the Saturday morning post”. Overall, Robinson seems to 
consider ‘social dividends’ very much in the same way as Meade, 
namely as a functional equivalent for forms of deficit spending and 
stimulating aggregate demand. Moreover, like Meade, she readily 
assumes that ‘social dividends’ could be paid for by printing money. 
Nevertheless, she notes that the actual advocates of ‘social dividends’ 
make their case exceedingly complicated and unconvincing. All in all, 
this implies that, in fact, she may be referring to followers of Major 
Douglas, a possible source I will comment on later. 
                                                            
14 Besides the possible confusion between the micro- and macro-usage of the term 
or between what is available to be divided and which part an individual gets 
after the division of what is available, there still is another meaning connected to 
the term. Much earlier, in the late 1880s, F.A. Walker (1888), amongst many oth-
ers, spoke of “the social dividend theory of taxation”—“which is, in effect, that 
the members of the community should contribute to the public support in pro-
portion to the benefits they derive from the protection of the state, or according 
as the services they receive cost the state more or cost it less.” (Walker, 1888, 487-
489) 
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A second discursive community to look at is the one related to the 
Review of Economic Studies and ‘the debate about market socialism’. 
’Social dividend’ is, of course, a concept referring directly to the 
theory of market socialism. The link is clear. One of the questions a 
theory of market socialism (or a theory of planning) needs to answer 
is “How to distribute the profits from the socialized industries?” (or 
“How to reward the use of social capital?”). One way to think about 
this problem is to make the analogy between dividends paid to 
shareholders in capitalism and ‘social dividends’ paid to every citizen 
as if to an alleged shareholder or owner of the socialized industries. 
The seminal articles on ‘Market Socialism’ by Oskar Lange ap-
peared in the Review of Economic Studies (1936, 1937a)—a journal ap-
pearing for the first time in 1933 and resulting from meetings of pre-
dominantly younger faculty from Cambridge, Oxford and the LSE 
(Durbin, 1985, 108; Wapshott, 2011, 106-108). Abba Lerner, Paul 
Sweezy and Ursula Hicks formed the original editorial trio. From ear-
ly on, Joan Robinson and James Meade were involved in the meetings 
leading up to organizing the journal. 
According to James Yunker (1977, 91), it was in his milestone essay 
‘On the Economic Theory of Socialism’ that Oskar Lange introduced, 
in 1936, “the term ‘social dividend’. It refers to the direct distribution 
equally among the citizen body of property income accruing to the 
state-owned enterprises under socialism.” Looking at the relevant 
passages in Lange’s work, makes clear that the matter is a bit more 
complicated and even a little different. A first point on which 
Yunker’s statement needs some correction concerns the equal distri-
bution condition. Reading Lange’s original articles (1936, 1937a) 
makes clear that for him, contrary to what Yunker suggests, equal 
distribution was not mandatory. Neither is there any mention of citi-
zenship rights. Actually, in the original article Lange proposed to dis-
tribute the social dividend proportional to wages. A critical remark 
by the co-editor of the Review, Abba P. Lerner (1936), pointed out 
that this principle of distribution would affect the allocation of labour. 
If Lange wants to keep the social dividend from interfering with the 
labour market, says Lerner, it needs to have lump-sum features. 
Lange (1937b) conceded the point in the next volume and when edit-
ing his text for final publication (Lange, 1938) incorporated Lerner’s 
critique, even without mentioning either the changes or their source. 
For this story, Abba Lerner is relevant not only because he made 
Oskar Lange change his original proposal. But even more so because 
‘social dividend’ plays an important role in his major work, The Eco-
nomics of Control (hereafter: EC). 
‘Social dividend’—sometimes between quotes, but mostly in ital-
ics, like any other technical term used in The Economics of Control—
enters the story after Lerner formulates on page 266 the command-
ment: “The government must adjust consumption and investment so as to 
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prevent inflation and unemployment.” (Emphasis by Lerner). Lerner ex-
plains this rule, meanwhile defining functional finance: “A conscious 
policy by the government for avoiding the evils of inflation and the 
evils of deflation we shall call functional finance.” The next com-
mandment reads: “The payment of a social dividend, which enables this to 
be done, must be independent of the amount of work done by the recipients.” 
(Emphasis by Lerner) 
To prevent the dual catastrophe of inflation and depression, “gov-
ernment is faced with the task of continuously maintaining a proper 
total demand for factors, through consumption and investment, so 
that there is just enough demand to give full employment but not 
enough to start an inflation.” (EC, 1944, 267) In a collectivist economy 
this could be done in two ways: first, through an adjustment of the 
rate of interest, second and more important, through the direct effect 
of government action on income. 
Lerner elaborates on the last point by first treating the way in-
comes in a collectivist society are distributed. 
The consumers receive part of their income from their work in payment 
for their labor by the managers of production, who hire labor in accord-
ance with the Rule. The rest of the income of consumers comes to them 
from the government. This can be considered as the citizen’s share of the 
earnings of the factors of production other than labor, but however it is 
considered, the government must distribute just enough to induce con-
sumers to spend the right amount which, together with the investment 
demand for factors, will provide full employment. The distribution of this 
‘social dividend’ may follow any principle that pleases the government. 
The only proviso that must be made in the interest of the optimum use of 
resources is that the amount paid out to any individual should not in any 
way be affected by the amount of work he does. This is because of the de-
sirability of having the wage equal to the vmp [= value of marginal prod-
uct, WVT] of labor (which is what the manager will be paying the worker 
quite apart from any ‘social dividend’) so as to induce neither too much or 
too little labor. In the name of the optimum division of income it can be 
argued that the distribution of the social dividend should not be very un-
equal. My personal inclination is for an equal share to be given to each 
member of society as his right as a citizen, with no questions asked and no 
exceptions. There could be no better safeguard of the freedom and inde-
pendence of the individual. (EC, 1944, 267-268) 
Lerner proposes inflation and depression can be prevented by adjust-
ing the level of the social dividend. This could be done very easily, 
“even from week to week, in accordance with the state of demand”. If 
spending is still too high after reducing the social dividend to zero—
which means that one can still buy more than what is produced by all 
the factors of production available—one “will need to have a negative 
social dividend—a tax—which reduces demand to the proper level.” 
(EC, 1944, 268) 
In the next two chapters Lerner treats the unemployment problem 
in the context of a capitalist economy. This gives us more or less a re-
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statement of the Keynesian doctrine. There is no sign whatever of so-
cial dividends. But in the 24th chapter—the one which is subtitled: 
functional finance—social dividends reappear. In that particular 
chapter, Lerner tries to strip the reader’s mind of any sign of ‘unfunc-
tional’ thinking about public spending, the national debt and taxa-
tion. Not prejudice, but their function in society should guide our pol-
icies, is Lerner’s motto. As well the leftist’s dogma—100% collectiv-
ism—as the dogma of the right—“to keep fiscal principles appropri-
ate to a grocery store” (EC, 1944, 302)—is rejected. About the ultimate 
objective, there should not be any doubt. Maintenance of full em-
ployment is the duty, perhaps even the primary duty of the govern-
ment. 
In the course of his argument Lerner explains that borrowing and 
taxing can also be applied in reverse, if the government wants to in-
crease the quantity of money in the hands of the people and lower the 
rates of interest. This can be done by repaying some of the national 
debt or, if there is not any, by creating a national credit, i.e. by lending 
or, eventually, by printing money. The alternative is to lower taxes. 
“Where this is not sufficient to bring about the required results even 
when taxes have been reduced to zero, negative taxes can be im-
posed. This means that the government instead of taking money 
away from people gives it to them. This may take the form of relief 
payments, old age pensions, bonuses, and even a social dividend 
when it is desired to increase consumption all round.” (EC, 1944, 310-
311) 
Several points are worth noting. First of all, for Lerner the social 
dividend is clearly a steering device, keeping the economy on the 
right but narrow track between inflation and depression. Secondly, 
Lerner stresses the necessity of its being independent from the 
amount of work done. Thirdly, Lerner states his preference for an 
equal distribution, based on a dual argument: citizenship rights on 
the one hand and a more utilitarian argument in terms of the optimal 
income distribution on the other hand. Fourthly, Lerner mentions the 
‘distributist state’—in 1951, he will refer to it as ‘democratic function-
alism’—in a positive way. Fifthly, no trace of a really practical scheme 
is apparent, although the mention of the negative taxes (and, possi-
bly, negative social dividends) may foreshadow something of this 
kind. 
Reading Lerner one is several times reminded of Meade’s Economic 
Analysis and Policy or Planning and the Price Mechanism. Not only with 
respect to economic analysis, but also with respect to the ideal societal 
model, they seem to have in mind when considering policy instru-
ments and institutional reform. Did Lerner influence Meade? Or was 
it the other way around? Or was there a common influence as may be 
suggested by the reference to the so-called ‘distributive state’ appear-
ing in the writings of both of them in nearly the exact same terms? 
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Answering these questions is difficult. One reason is that although 
The Economics of Control are published only in 1944, Lerner claims in 
the introduction to have worked on the book since 1932, making it 
very hard to know which part originated when. Moreover, archives 
do not seem to contain any correspondence between Meade and Ler-
ner in the relevant period, although they certainly must have had 
personal contact in the 1930s in meetings leading up to the setting up 
of the Review of Economic Studies and at other occasions. Yet, if per-
severance would count as an indication for the direction of the influ-
ence, it is relevant to know that after The Economics of Control Lerner 
would still use the phrase ‘social dividend’ but only once in his Eco-
nomics of Employment (1951, 126), whereas Meade fostered the idea till 
the end of his life. 
A third community of discourse in which Meade was involved 
was the so-called ‘Cole Group’ and the New Fabian Research Bureau. 
G.D.H. Cole was an important figure in Oxford in the thirties, pro-
fessor, influential with his wife in reorganising the Fabian Society, but 
also bringing together young intellectuals in what was known as ‘the 
Cole group’. Meade was a member of this group as an undergraduate 
between 1926 and 1930. When in 1931, under the impulse of the 
Coles, the New Fabian Research Bureau was set up Meade became 
involved, being one of the New Fabian economist, besides Evan Dur-
bin, Hugh Gaitskell and Colin Clark, who had also been a member of 
the Cole Group (Durbin, 1985, 97). 
In 1935, the same year as the Meade paper, Cole published Princi-
ples of Economic Planning. In this book, Cole refers explicitly to ‘social 
dividends’—a proposal he claims to have advocated for years. 
Cole introduces the social dividend in the 11th chapter of the book, 
when treating the planned distribution of incomes and production. 
Cole’s main objective is to get through that real planning, i.e. “to se-
cure that the available resources shall be both fully used, subject to 
the claims of leisure, and used to the best possible purpose” (Cole, 
1935, 220), not only involves control of the money machine but also 
needs planning of incomes. To explain why this is, in fact, the case, 
Cole starts from the assumption that Socialists introducing planning 
will want to plan production, “at least to some degree, according to 
conceptions of social expediency and justice” (Cole, 1935, 224). Next, 
he considers two such criteria. 
The first criterion is need (rather than demand): “the need for a 
generally diffused supply of all things which can be regarded as ne-
cessaries of civilised living will constitute the first overriding claim 
upon the available resources of production. A satisfactory minimum 
of food, fuel, clothing, housing, education and other common services 
will come before anything else, as a social claim that a planned econ-
omy must meet.” (Cole, 1935, 224) According to Cole there will hard-
ly be any doubt as to what is necessary for this universal minimum 
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and, thus, as to the corresponding total size of this primary claim. 
However, in advanced societies there is a wide range of goods and 
services which are neither necessaries nor luxuries. Cole terms them 
substitutable necessaries. Moreover, to which category some product 
belongs depends highly on the amount we have of it. So, Cole comes 
to his second criterion. 
it is necessary for everybody to have at least a minimum income which he 
can devote to buying goods and services of this second class. What he 
buys is for the most part his affair; and the more advanced a society is, the 
wider his range of choice is likely to be. The satisfaction of this need for 
further goods and services which, while no one of them is a universal nec-
essary, yet form a necessary part of a tolerable standard of living, will con-
stitute the second claim upon the available productive resources. (1935, 
225) 
As, in this second region, there will be doubts about what and which 
amounts to produce, Cole judges it highly desirable “to leave the in-
dividual citizen the widest range of choice in deciding which of these 
secondary goods and services he prefers, and is therefore prepared to 
pay for out of his limited income.” 
At this point in Cole’s argument, it becomes clear why the plan-
ning of incomes is so important. As soon as freedom of choice is as-
sumed, it becomes apparent that the structure of demand for this se-
cond class of goods depends on the structure of the income distribu-
tion. 
The primary necessaries can be distributed free to everybody, or, if they 
are sold, their prices can be lowered so as to bring them, or the required 
minimum quantities of them, within everybody’s reach, or again a basic 
minimum income can be assured to everybody without any general con-
trol of the distribution of incomes above the minimum. But none of these 
methods will solve the problem of planning the production of substituta-
ble necessaries. This will have to be done either in the light of the distribu-
tion of incomes as it is, or in the light of a planned redistribution of in-
comes. (Cole, 1935, 225-226) 
This point being established, Cole mentions a second advantage of 
planning the income distribution, i.e. getting rid of at least one im-
portant cause of fluctuations in demand, thereby making planning 
easier. Cole also considers a second cause of fluctuations of demand, 
namely changes of fashion. A cause one cannot remove, since changes 
of fashion cannot be anticipated. In this context, Cole points at the 
danger of large-scale production influencing fashion and pleads for 
organising consumers’ representation as a counterweight. He notes 
that if one could enlarge everyone’s surplus to be spent on substituta-
ble necessaries and cheap luxuries, “the consequent enlargement of 
freedom of choice is likely very much to outbalance any tendency of 
the planning authority to persuade consumers into buying what they 
do not want.” (Cole, 1935, 231) 
462 Walter Van Trier | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 8(4) : 439-474 
On which principles, then, incomes available for the purchase of 
consumer goods and services will be distributed? 
At present, incomes accrue to individuals either as payments for 
real or imputed services to production or as ‘doles’ of one sort or an-
other from the public purse. One of this system’s disadvantages is 
that income is cut down if production is cut down. Therefore, a 
planned economy will, according to Cole, seek to begin at the other 
end. “by distributing enough income to buy at the planned prices all 
the consumers’ goods and services which can be produced with the 
available productive resources, so as to leave adequate provision for 
the making of the requisite supply of capital goods.” (Cole, 1935, 234) 
On the surface, the new system will not seem very different. Yet, 
its significance will be altered. 
Incomes will be distributed partly as rewards for work, and partly as di-
rect payments from the State to every citizen as ‘social dividends’—a 
recognition of each citizen’s claim as a consumer to share the common 
heritage of productive power. I believe the tendency will be for a planned 
economy steadily to reduce the proportion of total income distributed in 
the first of these ways, and steadily to enlarge the amount of the social 
dividend … The aim should be as speedily as possible, to make the divi-
dend large enough to cover the whole of the minimum needs of every citi-
zen. Being paid as a civic right, it will be of equal amount for all, or rather 
for all adults, with appropriate allowances for children. It should be from 
the beginning at least large enough to cover the bare physical necessities 
of every family in the community. (Cole, 1935, 235) 
The level of the social dividend envisaged seems to be fairly high. In-
deed, the next page reveals that Cole reckons them to be higher than 
wages or salaries for the majority of the people. This way the degree 
of inequality would be highly reduced and forces Cole to consider the 
incentive effects. 
If the maximum a man could earn came to no more than the amount of his 
social dividend, the incentive to earn it, in a society living nearly at a 
common standard, would be fully as powerful as the incentive to earn 
many times as much in the class-ridden society of to-day. For the demand 
for little luxuries and larger supply of substitutable necessaries is the 
keenest of all human demands. ... Earnings will become, under such a sys-
tem, more and more of the nature of ‘pocket money’, without any loss of 
the incentives to effort such as absolute equality of incomes would in-
volve. Work will have its sufficient reward; but the main part of national 
income will no longer be distributed as a by-product of industry. (Cole, 
1935, 236) 
Hence, the incentive problem does not worry Cole, a position he 
would still maintain ten years later when returning to this question in 
a book on money (Cole, 1945). 
One can see that a social dividend system makes it possible to 
combine or to make compatible several values Cole would look for in 
a good society. As I would list them, they comprise amongst others a 
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fairly equal distribution of income, acknowledging human dignity, 
getting rid of a system linking demand too tightly to production, 
keeping incentives at work, giving the fullest possible scope to con-
sumer choice (even for the demand of leisure), and all this without 
relying too much on a bureaucratic system of government. Neverthe-
less, and contrary to Lange, Lerner and Meade, Cole stays an advo-
cate of administered prices. Moreover, his view seems to rest on very 
strong assumptions with regard to needs and consumer behaviour. 
In the course of this argument, or more specifically, at the point 
where he starts to explain how incomes would be distributed under a 
social dividend scheme, Cole writes: “There are two possible ways—
payments for work done, and ‘doles’, or, to give them a less coloured name, 
‘social dividends’.” (Cole, 1935, 234-235; my emphasis) Do we witness 
here the forging of the term ‘social dividend’ in the sense of an equal 
and universal unconditional payment? Did Cole forge at this spot the 
name? Or do the quotes mean that Cole took the name ‘social divi-
dend’ from some other context? Note, anyway, that also ‘doles’ is put 
between inverted commas.  
The possibility that Cole was referring to some other writings is, 
indeed, not farfetched. Earlier in his life, Cole was, as one knows, an 
important and ardent advocate of Guild Socialism and a co-founder 
of the National Guild Movement. One of the major events in the final 
stage in the life of this Movement was the break-away of particular 
faction advocating the heretic economic theories of Major C.H. Doug-
las. One of the main political slogans of this movement was: “Divi-
dends for All”. 
So, the fourth community of discourse from which ‘social dividend’ 
could have originated is the Social Credit Movement. 
In the biographical account he wrote at the occasion of being 
awarded the Nobel Prize, Meade mentions that he turned, in 1928, 
from Classics to Economics because he wanted to do something about 
the massive unemployment and under the influence of his aunt who 
was a follower of Major Douglas. When being in Oxford, in the late 
1920s, Meade invited the Major to speak and lunched with him. In a 
letter to the present author (27 April 1989), Meade writes remember-
ing having read a paper on Douglas to the Cole Group in 1927 in the 
presence of, amongst others, Beatrice Webb who vigorously “gave 
him hell”. 
On his own account and as made clear already by the criticism 
voiced at the Douglas framework in the very first chapter of his 1936 
book, An Introduction to Economic Analysis and Policy, after starting 
seriously with economics, Meade clearly saw the flaws in Social Cred-
it Theory. Trying to answer the question “Can the economic system 
work?” he dismisses the view that the problem of unemployment 
cannot be solved without a revolutionary change in the economic sys-
tem. “It is sometimes held that the existing economic system can nev-
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er distribute purchasing power sufficient to cover the costs of the 
output which is produced for sale; but this view is fallacious.” (EAP, 
1936, 2) For Meade, one can accomplish this  “without introducing 
socialism or a complete change in our monetary system” (EAP, 1936, 
2). In the next few pages he uses an example to refute what he sees as 
the “essential point in the analysis of Major Douglas” (EAP, 1936, 2-
5). Significantly, in his review of Consumers’ Credits, Keynes (1938, 67) 
takes care to note that “Mr. Meade is not what is usually called a ‘so-
cial credit theorist’, but he thinks that subsidies (as I should prefer to 
call them) to consumers have not received the attention which they 
deserve as a weapon in our armory against fluctuation.” 
Of course, that Meade no longer accepted the basic analysis on 
which Social Credit Theory rested does not necessarily mean that he 
did no longer consider as valuable in its own right the idea of paying 
unconditionally an equal sum to all individuals. It may well be the 
case that, as suggested by David Vines and Martin Weale (2009, 426), 
he remained keen on this one element, taken from Major Douglas’ 
writings and known in the Social Credit Movement as a ‘national div-
idend’. The main problem with this contention is that it is not at all 
clear when exactly ‘national dividends’, in the sense of an equal and 
unconditional payment, entered the discourse of the Social Credit 
Movement. For instance, the first time Major Douglas published a 
really concrete policy proposal—a Draft Social Credit Scheme for 
Scotland—was in The Glasgow Evening Times on March 11th, 1932. It 
proposed the implementation of a ‘national dividend’, but it was not 
really unconditional, because no to be paid to someone with an in-
come exceeding four times the amount of the national dividend and 
to be withheld, at least during the first five years after its implementa-
tion from people who did not accept suitable employment. Moreover, 
when in later writings a national dividend was advocated in the So-
cial Credit literature the arguments were based on the existence of an 
unearned increment or a social heritage, notions common to many 
other writers, and not on what constituted the core of the Douglas 
analysis, namely the A+B Theorem. To mend the latter problem was 
the task of the Just or Compensated Price15. In this context it is inter-
esting that, sixty years later, Meade wrote not having any doubt “that 
Douglas and Social Credit left a deep impression on me of the useful-
ness of the idea of giving consumers money to spend when there was 
a mass of unemployed and other resources.” (letter to the author, dat-
ed 26 April 1989) This could be interpreted as meaning that what he 
took from Douglasite Theory was its core idea, i.e. the lack of pur-
chasing power, but not the national dividend of which Meade makes 
no mention. In the same letter, Meade wrote: “I simply cannot re-
                                                            
15 For an extended analysis of the writings of Major Douglas and the Social Credit 
literature, see Walter Van Trier (1995, 143-342). 
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member how I came to use the phrase ‘social dividend’. But from 
what you say I may well have picked it up from Douglas Cole in my 
undergraduate years. I am afraid I simply don’t know.” 
6. About a Rendez Vous Manque 
Most fragments needed to tell the story of Meade’s ‘social dividend’ 
are now available. However, one remarkable piece should be added. 
In a preceding section, I conjectured that the idea of a ‘social divi-
dend’, as an equal and unconditional payment, fitted a conception 
inherent to James Meade’s view of a good economic life—a view rest-
ing on a deeply rooted life-long held moral conviction based on an 
equal importance of liberty, equality and efficiency—but without 
conceiving of a device to put the idea in practice until he encountered 
the Rhys-Williams Scheme. 
Surprisingly enough, a proposal, functionally equivalent to the 
Rhys-Williams one, but made public as early as 1918, could have been 
available to Meade, would it not have been for its complete disap-
pearance from the scene of social policy debate after being discussed 
and dismissed at the 1920 Labour Party Annual Conference at Scar-
borough. 
The clue to the rediscovery (in 1989)16 of this proposal lay in 
G.D.H. Cole’s The Next Ten Years in British Social and Economic Policy 
(hereafter: NTY), published in 1929—at a time Meade was a member 
of the Cole Group. In the preface, Cole mentions having started to 
write this book “because, whether I liked it or not, I had been com-
pelled by the movement of events to think out afresh my social and 
political creed.” (NTY, 1929, vii). One of the elements forcing Cole to 
do so was the conflict between providing a better standard of living 
through higher wages and the negative effect of higher wages on un-
employment; another was accepting the argument that the happiness 
of the individual was the ultimate criterion for judging states of af-
fairs.17 
The relevant fragment is contained in the chapter on ‘Wages, Fam-
ily Allowances and Population’. Socialism, Cole says in the introduc-
tory parts of this chapter, “will not be worth a brass button to the or-
dinary man unless it can improve the standard of life” (NTY, 1929, 
178). If so, however, a very real and difficult dilemma confronts so-
cialist politicians. Since under present circumstances raising wages 
may drive more workers into unemployment, the standard recipe to 
                                                            
16 The pamphlet is reproduced in the anthology of historical writings on basic 
capital and basic income edited by John Cunliffe and Guido Erreygers (2004). For 
an elaborate description of the proposal as well as an account of the detective 
work needed to trace it, see Van Trier (1991) and Van Trier (1995). 
17 For an interesting illustration of the latter point, see H. Gaitskell (1967, 13-14). 
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improve living standards has become difficult to use. For Cole, but 
one way allows to escape the dilemma. The only option left is advo-
cating a policy of “social redistribution”.18 
Twenty pages later, the discussion turns to how to judge the intro-
duction of family allowances. Cole points out that reforms along the-
se lines could lead to social redistribution, provided one states very 
clearly the right principles involved. Family allowances should not 
have anything to do with wages; they ought to be based on the prin-
ciple of need. If this is taken care of, they may even give way to a new 
form of social and economic organisation. Through family allowances 
“the principle of distribution according to need will ... begin to elbow 
the rival principle of payment for economic value received” (NTY, 
1929, 198). And he goes on: 
It seems probable that, on a somewhat longer view, this principle will be 
pushed a good deal further. This may be done by the complete commu-
nisation of certain services, as we have already communised elementary 
education. We may come to a ‘State Bonus’, or ‘Dividends for All’—to use 
two names which have been adopted by advocates of giving every citizen, quite 
apart from his work, a certain minimum claim to a share in the annual social 
product. Wages and earnings may come to be only supplementary pay-
ments for work, and not the main source of men’s livelihood.” (NTY, 1929, 
199; my emphasis) 
The fragment quoted is worth highlighting for several reasons. Not 
only can one consider it to be, as far as I know, the exact spot where 
Cole conceives of the idea of an unconditional income guarantee, 
which he later will name a social dividend. But the fragment is also 
most revealing with regard to the models Cole may have had in mind 
when writing these lines. Two are listed: ‘Dividends for All’ and 
‘State Bonus’. 
To judge adequately the importance of this fragment, let us put it 
against the background of New Jerusalems, the fascinating account by 
Elizabeth Durbin of the history of Inter-War British Socialism. Durbin 
mentions “Cole’s social dividend” when commenting on the signifi-
cance of Cole’s The Principles of Economic Planning (1935) and de-
scribes it as “an obvious descendant of the national minimum, which 
Sidney Webb had written into the Labour party’s constitution, of the 
‘Living Wage’, and of Major Douglas’s ‘social credit’, and a forerun-
ner of the minimum incomes provided in most modern welfare 
states.” (Durbin, 1985, 182) It is clear, however, that Durbin’s descrip-
tion needs to be qualified in at least two ways. Describing Cole’s ‘so-
cial dividend’ as something akin to present minimum income 
                                                            
18 Note the similarity with the problem Meade tackles in ‘New Keynesiana’, 
where automation leads to a state in which one will not be able to count on wages 
to cater for an acceptable distribution of income. And with Major Douglas who, 
from his first writings, stresses that in the economic model of the future divi-
dends will replace wages as the prime sources of income. 
| From James Meade’s ‘Social Dividend’ to ‘State Bonus’ 467 
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 8(4) : 439-474 
schemes is largely inaccurate. In fact, the quoted fragment from the 
1929 book makes clear that Cole means something fundamentally dif-
ferent, i.e. an equal cash payment unconditionally to all citizens. 
However, for our purpose, the most important point to be noted is 
that ‘State Bonus’ does not appear on Durbin’s list of models influenc-
ing Cole. In fact, it is completely absent from New Jerusalems. 
‘Dividends for All’ is easy to bring home. It is the title of a small 
book by W. Allen Young—an early collaborator of Major Douglas and 
considered by some to be his only close friend. The booklet was pub-
lished in 1921. It explained very clearly the Douglas Scheme and ad-
vocated it as the evident solution for the problems of the mining in-
dustry. Moreover, ‘Dividends for All’ may have been the first really 
accessible presentation of Social Credit Theory—both in terms of easy 
to read or understand, and readily available outside the circles of the 
‘New Age’ readership.19 
But what evidence can be gathered about the second model: ‘State 
Bonus’? 
Apparently, the ‘Scheme for a State Bonus’ was first made public 
by Dennis Milner in February 1918 at a meeting of the War and Social 
Order Committee of the Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends. Lat-
er that year, it was incorporated in: The Next Step in Social and Indus-
trial Reconstruction. Being Papers prepared for Meetings of the Commit-
tee on War and the Social Order (Appointed by London Yearly Meeting 
of the Society of Friends) together with Minutes recording the Consid-
ered Views of the Committee & a Short Biography and published sepa-
rately as a pamphlet, authored by Mabel E. and Dennis Milner. In 
their pamphlet the Milners advocate what they call “a State Bonus”: 
It is suggested - 
(a) That every individual, all the time, should receive from a central fund 
some small allowance, which would be just sufficient to maintain life and 
liberty if all else failed. 
(b) That everyone is to get a share from this central fund, so everyone who 
has any income at all should contribute a share each in proportion to his 
capacity. 
                                                            
19 Two facts warrant this conjecture: 1) W. Allen Young's is the first book on So-
cial Credit to be mentioned in 'The Economist' (books received section on Sept. 
3rd, 1921); and 2) when in 1922 the (later famous) Cambridge philosopher and 
mathematician Frank Ramsey publishes a critical (even devastating) examination 
of the Douglas theory in the ‘University of Cambridge Magazine’, he refers to 
Allen Young's booklet, not to Major Douglas’ own writings which he considered 
to be “always obscure and often absurd.” (F. Ramsey, The Douglas Proposals, 
manuscript FR 007-03-01, consulted at 
https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735044221558/from_
search/fe8a633e2bb88a17ed5ac78d010dee16-0) 
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It is clear that the proposal fits very well the idea of a social dividend 
in the sense of an equal and unconditional cash payment to each and 
every one. Moreover, the pamphlet does not only contain the idea in 
the abstract. It also tries to work out a way of implementation and 
even to cost the practical scheme proposed. 
A State Bonus League was formed in July 1918. In December 1918, 
Dennis Milner stood as an independent candidate in the General Elec-
tions (at Barkston Ash). In 1920, a negative report on the scheme was 
presented at the Annual Labour Party Conference. After 1921, no fur-
ther activity of the League seems to have taken place and State Bonus 
disappeared from the scene, leaving only a few traces in the literature 
of the time. One can find it reviewed (negatively) by Clara Collett in 
the June 1919-issue of the Economic Journal. A single reference to the 
scheme is contained in Eleonor Rathbone’s The Disinherited Family 
(1927). Hugh Dalton refers to it in a footnote in Some Aspects of the Ine-
quality of Incomes in Modern Communities (1920). Paul H. Douglas men-
tions it when reviewing in 1924 the British debate on Family Allow-
ances in the Journal of Social Forces and in The American Friend. But af-
terwards, it seems to have been completely forgotten. Before the re-
discovering of the scheme, the only mention in the social policy litera-
ture is in a book on the history of the British movement for family al-
lowances (Macnicoll, 1980). In this sense, it is not surprising that 
Meade, who was only in his early teens when the Scheme for a State 
Bonus was drafted and discussed. 
Setting up the ‘State Bonus League’ was the joint effort of the 
Milner couple and one of their friends, Bertram Pickard—a Quaker, 
just like the Milners. Pickard acted as one of the strong ‘amplifiers’ of 
the idea and was one of the main organisers of the League. He wrote 
a book about State Bonus, especially directed towards a Quaker pub-
lic, and many short articles, spreading the idea through a wide varie-
ty of newspapers. The withering away of the League may partly be 
caused by his getting, from 1921 onwards, more heavily involved in 
voluntary Peace Work. From 1922 till 1926, Bertram Pickard acted as 
secretary to the Friends’ Yearly Meeting Peace Committee. In 1926 
(and until 1940), he moved to Geneva to be the secretary of the 
Friends’ Geneva Centre and a liaison officer between the Society of 
Friends and the League of Nations. Later and for the rest of his life, 
Pickard would work for the United Nations in Geneva. 
For our story Bertram Pickard is important because he was a life-
long acquaintance of James Meade’s wife, Margaret Wilson, who 
knew the Pickard family since the 1920s. Margaret Wilson was a 
Quaker and the secretary of the strong Oxford branch of the League 
of Nations with Gilbert Murray as a chairman. “Margaret had close 
links with Geneva where she had spent some years as a student while 
her parents had been wardens of the Quaker Hostel there and where 
she had gone back as secretary to Gilbert Murray.” (Howson, 1988, 2). 
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In 1933, Margaret Wilson married James Meade. In the late 1930s, 
both the Pickards and the Meades lived in Geneva. In the 1940s, both 
the Pickards and the Meades, having returned to Britain because of 
the war, were living in Hampstead, London. After the war, links be-
tween the families stayed close. Alison Bush, Bertram Pickard’s 
daughter, visited James Meade regularly till the end of his life. 
Hence, the following situation presents itself. On the one hand, we 
have James Meade, fostering the idea of a social dividend since 1935 
and finally fitting it in 1988 as an essential part into the Agathotopian 
institutional framework. On the other hand, we have Bertram Pick-
ard, joining forces with the Milners to advocate in the period 1918-
1921 a scheme of social reconstruction fitting exactly the idea of a so-
cial dividend. Pickard and Meade probably met for the first time 
around 1935. 
Did James Meade get the inspiration for his ‘social dividend’—an 
equal and unconditional sum of cash paid to every member of the 
community—from the State Bonus Scheme advocated by Bertram 
Pickard? The conjecture does not seem outrageous. But no, he did 
not. James Meade20 never knew that Bertram Pickard, early in his life, 
advocated a scheme of social reconstruction fitting exactly an idea, 
inherent to his own view of a good enough place to live in.21 
7. Epilogue 
Looking in detail at the idea of a social dividend in the early writings 
of James Meade was meant to accomplish two tasks. The main objec-
tive was to trace the idea of an unconditional payment to all individ-
uals as well as the phrase ‘social dividend’ to refer to such a device in 
James Meade’s writings of the mid 1930s and to look at possible 
sources for the idea and the phrase. Discussing these possible sources 
lead to the conjecture that Meade encountered the idea of an uncondi-
tional equal payment as a citizen’s right most probably in circles 
around G.D.H. Cole with the latter as a possible originator of the term 
in the sense used here. An unexpected bonus of this search for origins 
                                                            
20 “My wife had known Bertram from the mid-20s and I knew him first from the 
mid-30s. He had already turned his interest to international problems of War and 
Peace and we neither of us even heard of his ‘Basic Income’ Interest.” (letter from 
James Meade to the present author, dated 11 October 1992) 
21 Meade only learned about the State Bonus Scheme and Bertram Pickard’s in-
volvement in late 1991 when Alison Bush at one of her regular visits told him 
about being contacted by a Belgian researcher for information about her father. 
Since Meade wondered why a researcher investigating his own place in the histo-
ry of social dividend would also be interested in Bertram Pickard, she showed 
him, on her next visit, copies of old newspaper articles her father had written 
about the State Bonus Scheme. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the 
late Alison Bush, daughter of Bertram Pickard, for the information she gave me 
about her father. 
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was the discovery of State Bonus, a long forgotten reform proposal 
and the occasion of a rendez-vous manqué between one of his main 
advocates, Bertram Pickard, and his good friend, James Meade. 
The other objective, expecting to have some relevance for the pre-
sent-day debate about basic income, was to look carefully at the role 
‘social dividend’ played in Meade’s writings. As a matter of fact, the 
analysis showed that a similar device—equal unconditional individu-
al payments—played three quite different roles and was expected to 
perform in each of these roles a very different task. Importantly, these 
different characters ‘social dividend’ takes on in Meade’s early writ-
ings do not represent subsequent stages in Meade’s theoretical devel-
opment. In fact, all three of them are present in Introduction to Econom-
ic Analysis and Policy, published in 1936. Moreover, all three of them 
will stay equally present in his later work, if not always side-by-side 
in the same book or article. 
However, in Agathotopian tales ‘social dividend’ seems to get still 
another role. It takes on the character of an Institutional Support, func-
tioning essentially as something that makes other institutional re-
forms beneficial and acceptable. Indeed, the major reform introduced 
by the Agathotopians, Meade learns from reports from his alter ego, 
Prof. dr. Semaj Edaem, was the transformation of Capitalist firms into 
Capital-Labour Partnerships. From this they expected a more consen-
sual model of industrial relations and a better approach to full em-
ployment. However, this reform had two drawbacks. Whereas, own-
ers of capital-shares can spread their portfolios, just like before, the 
incomes of owners of labour-shares are solely linked to the fate of 
their own firm. Moreover, reaching full employment might imply 
that not all additional workers own the same amount of labour-
shares. Agathotopian workers, apparently, were only willing to ac-
cept this wide-ranging institutional reform if, at the same time, a ‘so-
cial dividend’ was introduced to dampen the fluctuations and ine-
qualities now linked to ‘wages’ or income from labour shares. 
In other words, although ‘social dividend’ took on one of the three 
roles, described in Section 4, in many of his writings from the period 
1935-1988, its appearance in Meade’s final papers added a fourth pos-
sible role a social dividend or basic income could be expected to per-
form, namely to secure that other major institutional reforms would 
work out beneficially. Maybe, identifying this role and exploring how 
it can be played, instead of focussing only on more direct results as, 
for instance, reducing poverty and inequality, is Meade’s most im-
portant legacy for the present-day debate on basic income. 
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